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A POLITICAL SCIENTIST AND VOTING-RIGHTS
LITIGATION: THE CASE OF THE 1966 TEXAS
REGISTRATION STATUTE
WALTER DEAN BURNHAM*
A veritable revolution in the public law of voting rights has been
underway in this country since the early 1960's. Not so very long ago, it
was almost universally accepted doctrine that the states had nearly
plenary power to regulate the conduct of elections, the qualifications of
voters and the apportionment of legislative-district boundaries within
their borders. This sweeping power, for all intents and purposes, was
circumscribed only by the requirement that the states not discriminate in
too crude a way against racial minorities.' Since World War II this very
broad state discretion has undergone erosion, and this erosion has been
immensely accelerated during the past decade. Even the most cursory
review of the development of legal doctrine in this area must conclude
that the hitherto ascendant "American suffrage medley" has been
increasingly subjected to central authority. 2 As a consequence of both
judicial and congressional action, a considerable degree of
nationalization or standardization of suffrage and apportionment has
come into being.3
There is evidence that this era of national consolidation may now be
drawing to a close. The most conspicuous evidence is the remarkable
Supreme Court decision in Mitchell v. Oregon (Dec. 21, 1970), which
simultaneously affirmed Congress' power to set a uniform minimum
voting age of 18 in federal elections and invalidated that part of the 1970
Civil Rights Act which attempted to set the same standard for state and
local elections. Even so, judicial and legislative action since the
landmark case of Baker v. Carr and the 1965 Civil Rights Act has
produced a more explicit and comprehensive assertion of national
sovereignty over voting-rights and apportionment issues than any which
*Professor of Political Science, Washington University.
1. See, e.g., the early judicial invalidation of Oklahoma's "grandfather clause" in Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
2. D. McGovNEY, TE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY: THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL UNIFORM
SUFFRAGE (1949).
3. For an excellent review of the structure and growth of judicial doctrine in this area down to the
eve of Mitchell v. Oregon, see R. CLAUDE, TnE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
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has ever existed before, with the possible and partial exception of the
Reconstruction period.
Nor is the association with Reconstruction accidental. For at least the
past century, the balance between central and local control of electoral
process at any given time has been largely determined by the level of
national tolerance of racism in our political life. The national
commitment to juridical equality for all American citizens which has
emerged over the last generation has inevitably subjected all sorts of
exclusionist Southern electoral-management devices to a devastating
attack from the center. But with this movement has also come a much
wider sensitivity to the more subtly discriminatory nature of many state-
prescribed "rules of the game" which have little obtrusive relationship
to race or region.
It is not the purpose of this commentary to deal at length with the
evolution of judicial doctrine and legislative action affecting voting
rights. Rather, I shall attempt a sketch of two things here: the
background and implications of a recently decided case in which a
state's personal-registration statute was struck down by a federal court,
and my own involvement in the case.
Between 1890 and 1908, all eleven of the ex-Confederate states
adopted without effective federal challenge an interlocking network of
legal devices whose primary purpose was to purge blacks from their
electoral processes. This is now a matter of common knowledge, even
knowledge of the special sort subject to official-and especially judi-
cial-cognizance. But it is perhaps less apparent that these control de-
vices were paralleled in a less extreme form elsewhere by the introduc-
tion at the same time of such devices as literacy tests, contrived
malapportionments and personal-registration statutes which initially
were applied solely against the populations of major cities. There are
certain broad themes which link the origins of all such legislation
together. To a very great degree, it was motivated by racism - in the
North, directed against the "newer races" immigrating from Eastern
and Southern Europe - and by fear of the considerable potential for
political radicalism during an era of transition to industrial-capitalist
hegemony over the political economy.4 To this should be added more
than a dash of old-middle-class reformism directed against state and city
4. See W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS ' 1-90
(1970). For an illuminating review of the effects of this fear on the development of judicial doctrine




"machines" and their ethnic clienteles. Perhaps most important was the
influence of a broad, if very ambiguously defined, consensus that voting
was rather more a privilege the individual had to prove himself worthy to
exercise than a right which was an attribute of adult citizenship.
The peculiarities of such American suffrage-regulating mechanisms as
personal-registration statutes are best appreciated in a comparative
context. During the same transitional period, virtually every other
Western democratic polity - including Canada to our north - made
public authority, not the individual, legally responsible for the burden of
voter registration. Virtually everywhere outside the United States,
government is charged with the duty of compiling and updating registers
of qualified electors. This might seem to be a small enough matter of
technical detail, were it not for the demonstrated fact that personal-
registration qualifications impose a sociologically differential barrier to
the exercise of the franchise.5 The United States has incomparably the
steepest class differentials in voting participation to be found in any
western nation. Turnout among blue-collar strata is normally hardly
more than half of the rate of participation among professional-
managerial people. There is no doubt that the reasons for this are
complex, but two considerations emerge which are relevant to this
discussion. In the first place, personal-registration statutes produce a
measurable and substantial depressing effect on lower-class
participation. Secondly, before about 1900, class differentials in
American voting participation, at least outside the South, were
extremely small - probably not much if any greater than in Germany or
Sweden today.
Perhaps most remarkable of all, the adoption of personal-registration
statutes appears to have met with practically no effective resistance in
the 1890-1910 period. Moreover, a perusal of the literature of political
science down until well after World War II reveals only the most limited
awareness of the political sociology involved. Indeed, the entire question
was virtually invisible to scholars and political elites alike; the device was
simply accepted by something approaching unanimous consent. Such
unquestioning acceptance of this form of electoral bookkeeping can, I
think, be explained only on the ground that the individual-responsibility
value premises on which the legislation rested conformed admirably to
the larger postulates of an individualist-liberal political culture at a time
5. Kelley, Jr., Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First, 61 AM. POL. SM. REv. 359
(1967).
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when these postulates had not been brought under effective critical
review, either in academic or other elite circles.
The voting-fights revolution has changed a good deal of this. Perhaps
more precisely, this revolution is itself an artifact of a changing and
much more self-conscious awareness by judges, lawyers and academics
about the nonobtrusive social costs of a traditional American politico-
legal pattern. One result is that political scientists like myself are now
being asked to contribute position papers to party commissions
concerned with expanding and equalizing the franchise, and also
depositions in cases challenging the constitutionality of certain kinds of
personal-registration statutes.
There is a sense in which the creation of new ranges of constitutional
doctrine can sometimes be said to flow from a "dialectic of extremes".
This was particularly obvious in the decisional background of Brown v.
Board of Education which laid down the general doctrine that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." For the Supreme Court
had been sensitized over a number of years to the sociological realities of
educational segregation by a series of law-school cases extending from
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) to Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). As lawyers, the Justices could see from
their own experience and knowledge that "separate" was not only far
from being "equal" in the field of legal education, but that racial
segregation itself fundamentally denied equality of opportunity or of
access to the larger benefits of professional status to the blacks involved.
From this point in 1950, it required rather little more for the Justices in
the 1954 Segregation Cases to reach their famous reformulation of the
relationship between racial separation and equality in education
generally.
Of course, it would be most premature to assume that the public law
of personal-registration statutes will follow the same pattern even though
alternative procedures for voter enrollment exist elsewhere which
minimize the severe class bias in voter participation so conspicuously
associated with personal registration. Indeed, there seem to be specific
difficulties in the way of such a doctrinal evolution from "extremes" to
general principles in this field. First, the profound national consensus
about the utility and equity of these procedures has only very recently
been significantly challenged even by professional students of the
American political process. It can be assumed that challenges directed at
the substantive sociological effects of such statutes as a general class of




in being accepted by courts. Second, the equal-protection questions
involved in this area seem to lead further away from the originally close
relationship between race and voting-rights litigation. This requires the
establishment of a quite discrete array of empirical evidence which,
related to the more diffuse class implications of registration statutes, has
power to persuade courts; and this too will take time. Third and not least
important, changes in the personnel of the U.S. Supreme Court produce
the likelihood - at least in the short run - that a more or less
"conservative" majority, a majority of Justices whose decision-shaping
values may not include sensitivity to such empirical demonstrations, will
control the court's decisions.
Nevertheless, we may be on our way. An extreme case which
highlights a more general problem has emerged in Texas. This case is of
particular interest, both because it sets a precedent involving judicial
scrutiny of personal-registration statutes and the requirements they
establish for individual access to the polls, and because of the court's
heavy reliance in its opinion upon the testimony and quantitative data
presented by political scientists.
Before 1966, Texas was one of the few states which still imposed a poll
tax as a prerequisite for voting. The paid-up poll tax receipt was used by
election officials as the equivalent of personal registration. Such receipts
had to be collected and the tax paid not later than January 31 of the year
in which the election was to take place. After judicial invalidation of the
poll tax prerequisite,' the Texas legislature drafted a personal-
registration statute which was in essence a reenactment of the old poll
tax law with the $1.75 left out. The 1966 statute had two leading features
which worked to depress turnout about as much as possible without
including a money charge for voting. First, it provided for closing the
registry books as of January 31 of the year of election. Second, it
provided for a system of periodic personal-registration, i.e., the
individual was required to reregister in person every year.7
In February, 1970, one Jimmy F. Beare of Corpus Christi attempted
to register, but was turned away by local officials because the January 31
cutoff date had passed. Suit was brought in federal district court to
challenge the constitutionality of the 1966 Texas registration statute.
Along with several other political scientists, I was contacted by
6. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); United States v. Texas, 252 F.
Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex.), affd, 384 U.S. 155 (1966).
7. A comprehensive discussion of this law is found in Doty, Texas Voter Registration Law and
the Due Process Clause, 7 HOUSTON L. Rv. 163 (1969).
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attorneys for the plaintiff in the spring of 1970 and asked to provide
answers to certain questions of fact in my capacity as a professional
student of voting behavior. The interrogatories and my answers to them
follow in an appendix to this discussion.
On January 7, 1971, a three-judge federal district court unanimously
invalidated both the statute and a parallel provision of the Texas
constitution 8 as being in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In his opinion for the court, Judge Singleton
followed his preliminary statement of the controversy by a forceful
assertion of the right to vote as a fundamental social and political value
in the United States. The opinion goes on to observe that "It is beyond
doubt that the present Texas voter registration procedures tend to
disenfranchise multitudes of Texas citizens otherwise qualified to
vote." 10 This conclusion was based on the court's estimate that at least
one million Texans were effectively disenfranchised by the onerous
requirement of annual registration, and that about one million Texans
were also disenfranchised by the cutting off of registration more than
nine months before the date of the general election. In turn, these
estimates are wholly based on the testimony given by political scientists,
particularly by Professors Allen Shinn of the University of Texas,
Stanley Kelley, Jr., of Princeton University and myself. One of the most
enlightening features of Professor Shinn's presentation was the
determination that turnout increases at a rate of about 2.7% for each
month of an election year as one approaches the date of the general
election - a fairly precise statement of the familiar generalization that
many people tend to become motivated to vote by exposure to the issues
and individuals of a political campaign, not months before the
candidates actively take the field.
The court then reviewed the state's claim that it had a predominant
state interest in the maintenance of these procedures. It first concluded
that annual registration was hardly compellingly necessary to avoid
electoral corruption or fraud: elections in the overwhelming majority of
8. Article VI, Section 2.
9. Beare v. Smith, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Tex. 1971).
10. Id. at _(advance sheet at 7-8).
11. Here, as the district court points out, the Supreme Court has insisted since 1965 that the state
interest in regulating the suffrage must be shown to be compelling. Id. at - (advance sheet at 13).
The leading cases relied on by the district court are: City of Phoenix v. Kolodgiejski, 90 S. Ct. 1990





states which have permanent rather than periodic registration are clean
enough for the most part. The court then turned to an argument made by
the state which brilliantly discloses the profound significance of this
case.
One such interest suggested by the state as compelling which the
provisions in question are said to promote is the purity of the ballot. In
other words, the state contends that those who overcome the annual
hurdle of registering at a time remote to the fall elections will more likely
be better informed and have greater capabilities of making an intelligent
choice than those who do not care enough to register. This is a claim
which cannot be accepted. . . .A state may not dilute a person's vote to
give weight to other interests, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), much less deny it completely to thousands of Texans who fail to
comply with the existing registration statutes. I2
Here, in 1971, we are confronted with a fundamental issue of political
philosophy and values. The Texas argument here is-couched in modern
form-the proposition that voting is less a universal right than a
privilege to be confined, if possible, to the melior pars of the citizenry.
The theory which animated the original poll-tax legislation still
dominates the thinking of the state's officials; it represents one side of an
ancient controversy. The key issue in this controversy is simply this: is
there, or ought there to be, a social stratum which should be accepted as
.,weightier" than the rest of the citizenry because of some supposed
virtue, and hence be given legally-prescribed preference over the rest?
This is the kind of question to which, broadly, only a yes or a no is a
possible answer; and the answer defines the respondent's political
philosophy. Conflict over which answer to this question is to prevail can
be easily traced back to the debates on enfranchisement in the
Massachusetts and New York conventions of 1820 and 1821, and
beyond into the colonial period.' 3 But it is ultimately traceable to a still
earlier if not primordial set of debates: those conducted at Putney by
members of Oliver Cromwell's army in the years 1647-1649, and
especially a justly memorable colloquy between General Ireton and
Colonel Rainborough.1
Lest it be said that this is very ancient history indeed, let us examine
•12. - F. Supp. at - (advance sheet at 17-18).
13. J. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1966).
14. PURITANISM AND LIBERTY: BEING THE ARMY DEBATES (1647-1649) (A. Woodhouseed. 1951)
esp. at 53-64.
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the antiphonies involved, not only within each "debate" but between the
two, separated as they are by more than three centuries. First, the
exchange between Rainborough and Ireton concerning voting and
representation:
Rainborough: . . .For really I think that the poorest he that is in
England hath a life to live, as the greatest he; and therefore truly, sir, I
think it's clear, that every man that is to live under a government ought
first by his own consent to put himself under that government; and I do
think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense
to that government that he hath not a voice to put himself under...
Ireton: . . .Give me leave to tell you, that if you make this the rule I
think you must fly for refuge to an absolute natural right, and you must
deny all civil right; and I am sure it will come to that in the
consequence. . .. I think that no person hath a right to an interest or
share in the disposing of the affairs of the kingdom, and in determining or
choosing those that shall determine what laws we shall be ruled by here -
no person hath a right to this, that hath not a permanent fixed interest in
this kingdom, and those persons together are properly the represented of
this kingdom, and consequently are to make up the representers of this
kingdom, who taken together do comprehend whatsoever is of real or
permanent interest in the kingdom. 5
Then, in 1970-71, came the case of Beare v. Smith. The argument
made by Texas to justify its procedures has already been stated as
paraphrased by the court: it asserts a compelling state interest in
insuring that only the intensely political survivors of its multiple
procedural hurdles will be admitted to the active electorate. By such
tests, apparently, such voters will have demonstrated that they have a
"permanent fixed interest in this kingdom," now that poll taxes may no
longer be levied. The court's answer to this is a remarkably
unambiguous statement of the opposite view:
At the outset, it must be said that the right to vote is a right which is at
the heart of our system of government. . . .That government should
derive its powers from the consent of the governed is one of the basic
tenets of the Declaration of Independence. This right is one which has
been jealously guarded by the judiciary over the years."
Later in his opinion, Judge Singleton incorporated with approval the
following commentary by an outside observer:
Participation in decisions affecting one's life and the community
15. Id. 53-54.




contributes to the growth of the individual and tends to promote the
stability of the political system by enhancing its legitimacy. In this day
and age, with many explosive forces at work, we should pay more
attention to the stability acquired by justly giving to all qualified citizens
easy access to the ballot.'7
Admitting that Rainborough was obviously committed to the political
fate of the little man, while the author quoted approvingly by the court is
more preoccupied with stabilizing the political system, the resonance
thus achieved with the utterances of a man dead more than three hundred
years is nonetheless striking.
The issue presented here is of the most cardinal importance in
determining what "free government" actually means in concrete terms.
For those of us who may have thought that this issue had become largely
academic in the United States, Texas' Iretonian argument of 1970
comes as a pointed reminder that it is not academic at all. Still more, it
reveals with unusual clarity that this primordial question of political
value has never been conclusively resolved in this country down to the
present day. If it be true that this is an extreme case, and that Texas'
argument was expressed in exceptionally explicit if not crass terms, it
seems to me equally true that personal-registration requirements as such
survive because the United States has yet to accept without ambiguity
the elementary proposition that voting in elections is an attribute of
adult citizenship, and not a reward for good behavior or some superior
virtue.
So far as the district court's reliance on social-science evidence is
concerned, of course, no new ground was broken here. The growing
complexity of society long ago brought the realization to lawyers and
judges that expert testimony was required for rational decisions in many
fields where judicial decisions were to be made. It was after all at the turn
of this century that the Goldmark-Brandeis brief, with its heavy
emphasis on sociological data relevant to legal problems, was developed;
and as early as 1908 that the Supreme Court's decision in a major case
was informed by the data in such briefs.18 The precedent here is
substantive, not methodological: courts are now involved in exploring a
major "gray area" of voting rights, though how far they move into
it-or even whether they remain in it - must ultimately rest on what the
17. Id. at - (advance sheet at 18-19), citing May, The Texas Voter Registration System, 16
PUB. AFFAIRS COMMENT 4 (July 1970).
18. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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Supreme Court does in the years ahead. Even so, one further note about
method should be added. The quantitative-behavioral revolution in the
study of voting has permitted political scientists to develop increasing
precision in their statements about the effects of electoral laws on
electorates." We are in a far better position than even five years ago to
provide concrete information which should be useful to courts as they
evaluate the right to vote on one hand and the "compellingness" of state
interest in suffrage regulations on the other.
The process of egalitarian standardization of voting requirements in
the United States will, I think, prove irreversible in the long run. Our
self-consciousness about supposedly neutral "rules of the game" has
almost certainly undergone irreversible expansion. That new-found
consciousness alone will make it difficult for a number of traditionally
sanctioned practices to survive indefinitely. Moreover, individuals who
are subject to complex procedural restrictions on their right to vote will
be increasingly likely to file suits challenging the constitutionality of
such restrictions. Both the volume of this litigation and the pressure
engendered by it to change legal doctrine and formulate universalistic
norms will correspondingly increase. And thus the involvement of
voting-behavior specialists in the judicial process - a properly
peripheral but not insignificant involvement - will probably not cease
with Beare v. Smith.
10. Cf. D. RAE, THi POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS (1967).
[Vol. 1971:335
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APPENDIX
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
JIMMY F. BEARE, ET AL X
VS. X CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 70-C-42
PRESTON SMITH, ET AL X
ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES
BY: WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63130.
5. Occasion to engage in research on voting statutes and electoral participation. Yes, I have had
such occasion.
(a) The nature of my research and study is as follows: I have compiled estimates of the
total potential (adult male/adult citizen) voting population by state for the period 1824-
1968. In addition, I am now working on a more refined project examining voter participation
by counties in a number of states over the past hundred years, and the correlates of current
voting participation in one major city.
6. What is a personal registration system? A personal registration system is one in which
individual voters are required by law to appear in person before designated registration or election
officials, and to declare-under penalty for false declaration-that they are qualified electors under
the relevant provisions of state law governing suffrage qualifications. In all cases of which I have
knowledge, the registration statutes establish dates during which the registry books are open for new
personal enrollments, and also the places at which the registration is to take place.
(a) The relationship between personal registration systems and electoral participation in
general. My research and study has shown a very marked relationship between personal
registration and electoral participation. In explaining this relationship, two points of
comparative analysis need to be borne in mind. (1) In a number of American cases, past and
present, personal registration statutes have applied only to urban places, or counties in which
large cities are to be found. In rural or small-town areas, no personal registration is required
for voting; simple appearance at the polls on election day suffices. Prior to about 1900 this
was nearly universally the case in the United States. (2) In European countries and Canada,
the burden of registration and of the enrollment of qualified voters is assumed by central
state authority. This is the functional equivalent of the absence of personal registration
requirements in some American rural counties; both are, in effect, nonpersonal, permanent
registration systems.
It is, therefore, easy to establish quantitative statements which indicate the approximate effect of
personal registration as an intervening variable in voting participation. Annexes I-III are presented
at the end of my answers to these interrogatories. Three states are stratified by registration
requirements. In the case of Pennsylvania (Annex I), personal registration statutes for cities of the
third class and larger were subjected to personal registration requirements in 1906. From then until
1937, other areas of the state were non-registration territory; in the latter year, permanent personal
registration was extended to the entire state. In no case except for Philadelphia did personal
registration during this period extend to the whole territory of any county; consequently, the
category "Registration counties" for the period ending in 1937 should be understood to be roughly
equivalent to the "partial registration" category found in Ohio (Annex III). Evaluation of the
difference between the two sets of Pennsylvania counties in the period 1900-1960 is achieved through
a standard t-test of significant differences between means and standard deviations in each of the two
Washington University Open Scholarship
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groups. Establishing (for a one-tailed test, since direction can be predicted, i.e., the hypothesis can
be made a priori that personal registration requirements tend to depress electoral participation,
(ceterisparibus) a.01 level for significant differences, we find that all of the years from 1908 through
1940 show t values higher than could be attributed to chance except for 1928, and that remarkably
high values appear for the years 1912, 1916, 1920, 1924, 1932 and 1936. So far as the non-
registration counties are concerned, it is particularly significant that the 1936 figure of 80.0%
participation, achieved just before the imposition of statewide registration, has not come close to
being equalled since, even in the high-participation year 1960; while in the registration counties, the
1960 turnout rate was almost as high as that reached in 1936.
Annexes II (Missouri) and III (Ohio) reveal aggregate arrays of the same type. In the case of
Ohio, the stratification falls into three groups by completeness of personal registration coverage:
and participation monotonically decreases with the extent of personal registration in the counties in
question. Data not reported here reveals also that, as counties acquire personal registration systems,
their turnout falls by roughly 8 to 12 per cent from previous levels-approximately the same as with
the 1936 and 1960 turnout levels in the non-registration counties of Pennsylvania.
Annex IV presents estimated voter turnout in Texas for the period 1928-1968 and in the nation as
a whole. Further discussion of non-American participation rates is deferred to Question 11.
7. Has your research shown any relationship between personal registration systems and class bias
and voterparticipation? Yes, although as a professional student of electoral processes, I should at
some point emphasize that there are many variables which enter into a truly comprehensive
evaluation of the influence of registration as such on class stratification in American electoral
participation. It seems evident to me, however, that such relationship exists.
If so, what is that relationship? The analytical argument in favor of the relationship is simple
enough, and is essentially taken from Anthony Downs' volume, An Economic Theory of
Democracy. Putting the matter most simply, it can be said that any personal registration system
imposes costs of access to the polls on individual voters to some extent. These costs are legally
identical but sociologically sharply differentiated; that is, people of lower socio-economic status will
tend to find the additional hurdle of personal registration more of a barrier (in terms of expenditure
of scarce time resources, the costs of transportation to central places of registration, etc.) than will
people in the middle classes. The extreme case can be found in the dense network of hurdles which
were set up by the Southern states in the period 1890-1904-including in many cases extremely
laborious and inconvenient registration procedures. Such hurdles were explicitly set up to achieve
complete disfranchisement of Negroes, of course; but they clearly worked to disfranchise
considerable parts of the poor-white populations of these states as well.
Further discussion of comparative class stratification in voter participation will be left to the
answer to Question 11. At this point, several ranges of data can be presented. (i) Prior to the
introduction of personal registration statutes, the turnout in a number of states was so high as to
make it virtually certain that lower-class people participated about as fully as did middle and upper-
class people. Thus, for example, the following turnout in the 1880-1896 period can be found in
several selected states with considerable urban populations:
% Turnout of Estimated Potential Electorate
1880 1884 1888 1892 1896 Mean, 1952-68
Illinois 89.9 84.4 82.9 86.0 95.7 73.9
Indiana 94.4 92.2 93.3 89.0 95.1 74.5
New Jersey 95.4 88.6 91.9 90.3 88.4 69.7
New York 89.3 87.5 92.3 86.3 84.3 65.6
Ohio 94.4 93.4 91.9 86.2 95.5 67.6
There are, as mentioned above, a number of explanations for the much lower turnout in these states
today than in the 1880-1896 period; but among these, personal registration costs of access to the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss2/7
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polls seem of considerable significance. It seems evident on the face of the data that in this earlier
period there must have been virtually no differential in turnout along class lines in these states.
(2) The existence of profound class bias in actual participation is easy to detect in the United
States at the present time. It can, I think, be categorically stated (to anticipate somewhat my answer
to Question 11) that this bias is sharper by far in the United States than in any other Western
democratic political system.
Annex V presents correlation data drawn from intensive aggregate analysis of Baltimore, 1952-
1968, resting ultimately on the precinct level. The simple correlation array at the top of the page sets
out in sharp relief the extremely sharp class-related basis of electoral participation in that city.
There is also a substantial negative correlation between turnout and the nonwhite population, as
could be expected. What is doubly significant, however, is that when class is controlled for in the
multiple correlations, at the bottom of the page, the racial-ethnic correlations virtually disappear.
Indeed, the percentage Negro and the percentage turnout is actually positively correlated, once the
former is controlled for by two classifications of lower-class percentages in the 1960 male labor
force. This further reinforces the point that, untangling racial-ethnic variables, class remains clearly
the strongest predictor of turnout and that there is a systematic relationship between the two. This
can be summarized more simply by the assertion that, on balance, the ratio between upper-middle
class and lower-class turnout in Baltimore is approximately 2 to 1.
The same point emerges from the recent sample surveys taken by the Census Bureau in its
Current Population Reports series. The relevant photo-copied pages for the 1968 report (Series P-
20, No. 192, December 2, 1969) are included as Annex VI.
Finally, it seems extremely likely that, granted the systematic differences in voter participation in
areas with personal registration systems and in areas without, the class bias of participation is
markedly less strong in non-registration areas (those which correspond functionally to European
politics where registration is assumed by the state) than in areas which, like Baltimore City, impose
this additional cost of access to the polls on the individual voter.
8. What is a periodic registration system? A periodic registration system is one in which, in
addition to the requirements of personal registration, the individual voter is also required to re-
register in person, usually before each election.
9. Has your research shown any relationship between periodic registration systems and electoral
participation in general? On the whole not, since such systems have tended to become unusual in
the United States. I am able, however, to cite two points in texts by leading American political
scientists; these are referred to immediately below.
If so, what is that relationship? It is, again, perfectly clear to me that the additional imposition of
a requirement that individual voters re-register in advance of each election will further depress
turnout above and beyond what might be expected from the effects of personal registration systems
generally. One authority for this view is that of The American Party System, 3rd. (1940) edition, by
Charles Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell. These two scholars, both of the University of Chicago,
were among the leading experts on American politics a generation ago. They comment as follows (p.
385):
"When personal registration was adopted in the large cities of this country, it was felt that
it should be periodic. The requirement of a new personal registration at frequent intervals
would automatically clear the lists of those who had died or moved away. Registration was
made annual in New York and a number of states, while it was made biennial or quadrennial
in other states. There is no question that the periodic systems of registration are burdensome
upon the voters and virtually disfranchise many qualified persons .. " (emphasis added)
The requirement imposed by the New York legislature whereby voters in New York City, and
only such voters, were required to register annually was particularly notorious as a bone of
contention between the city and the upstate areas which controlled the legislature. The late V.0.
Key, Jr.-the undisputed dean of students of American politics during his lifetime-had the
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following to say about the New York case in his text, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New
York: Crowell, 1958-4th edition) at pp. 677-678, footnote 8:
"Nonpersonal registration is used in over half the election districts in upstate New York.
In 1950 registration in ten of the 57 upstate counties of New York exceeded the numbers of
citizens 21 and over as reported by the census. In another II counties registrants numbered
between 90 and 100 per cent of the citizenry of voting age. In New York City, with personal
[and at the time periodic-WDB] registration, only 53.5 per cent of the citizens 21 and over
were registered; in the state outside the city the percentage was 79.8."
The periodic-registration requirement for New York City was at last abolished by the state
legislature in 1957, and a permanent registration substituted for it.
A very rough estimate on my part would be that-assuming that, as in New York, periodic re-
registration was permitted up to a few weeks before election day-such an additional burden on the
voter would depress turnout by between 10 and 20 per cent from what might be expected from a
permanent registration system fairly and non-discriminatorily administered.
10. Has your research shown any relationship between periodic registration systems and class
bias in voterparticipation? In terms of specific research on this question, the answer has to be no. It
is my professional judgment, however, that the requirement for periodic re-registration would
inevitably work through a kind of multiplier effect to increase even further the class bias in voter
participation which exists under American permanent-registration systems. The argument in my
answer to Question 7, as well as reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the New York
registration data reported in my answer to Question 9, lead almost inevitably to such a conclusion.
11. Does class bias exist in registration systems used outside the United States in countries whose
cultures and traditions are somewhat cognate to our own? This question is put a little inaccurately.
We may begin with the point that throughout Western Europe and in Canada, the responsibility for
developing registers of qualified voters and keeping them up to date is borne entirely by
governmental authority, delegated in some cases (such as Great Britain and Canada) to Electoral
Officers with powers to punish for noncompliance by individuals with their surveys of the resident
population. By definition, therefore, such systems preclude class bias in the registration procedure,
except in the very limited sense that people of the very lowest social classes may be difficult to locate
at fixed addresses. If one asks, however, what class bias tends to exist in European or Canadian
voting turnout at elections, the answer is somewhat more varied. In general, it can be surmised that
a moderate class differential in participation may exist in Canada and Great Britain, though I have
no data which bears directly on this. It seems certain that even here, the class bias in turnout is
immeasurably less than it is in the United States, if it indeed exists to any significant extent.
Voting turnout in Continental Europe is much more nearly invariant along classs lines, and is
also much higher, than it is in the United States. In general, it can be said that in historical
perspective, class bias in which middle-class persons participated more than working-class persons
was more frequently encountered in European political systems before World War II and especially
before World War I, but that: (a) in the past quarter-century such bias has virtually disappeared;
and (b) there are numerous cases even in the earlier period of high mobilization of all classes in the
population. (See Annexes VII, VIII and IX.)
Whatfactors cause this difference? A comprehensive answer to this question-which answer even
then would be necessarily incomplete-would require a whole volume. For what ultimately is
involved is a whole network of causes; the key question, far transcending in importance even the
personal registration question, is this: what causes and perpetuates the exceptional political and
social demoralization and fragmentation of the lower classes which exists in this country? I can
affirm as a professional judgment that personal registration requirements constitute a significant
barrier to participation by people of lower socio-economic status. But much more is involved. I have
developed some discussion of this problem in my forthcoming book, but further discussion here
would probably be irrelevant to a civil action in which the constitutional validity of certain statutory
requirements for registration of voters is at issue.
12. (a) Yes, I have an opinion regarding the probable consequences of establishing a permanent,
non-periodic registration system of the sort described in the question.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss2/7
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13. My judgment is that it would considerably reduce the burden on the individual voter.
Requiring individuals to re-register for each election with a terminal date falling months before the
actual election is particularly onerous. People become interested in elections during the campaign,
not months before it; and it is my considered view that having a January 31 cutoff date for periodic
registration guarantees a low turnout; indeed, a turnout which is probably about as low as possible
short of a reimposition of the poll tax.
In 1968 (1 assume under the registration law now under attack), almost exactly one-half of the
potential electorate of Texas voted for presidential electors. I believe that a permanent registration
system-provided that it permitted registration up to a few weeks or days before primary and
general elections, as is now common in this country-would permit Texas turnout to increase from
50% to between 65% and 70%. In 1968, the estimated potential electorate of Texas was
approximately 6,180,000. Of these, only 3,078,917 actually voted in the presidential election. An
increase of turnout to 65% would be equivalent to adding about 940,000 voters to the presidential
electorate. If the turnout reached 70%, this would involve an addition of about 1,250,000 persons
who did not actually vote in 1968 in Texas. Even if the periodic-registration requirement was
responsible for only one-half of this difference, it is evident that hundreds of thousands of potential
voters are involved.
14. Were Texas to eliminate its personal registration system and place the burden of registration
on the government, the probable result would be to increase electoral participation to a maximum of
about 80% of those potentially qualified-a rate significantly below that of many European
countries, but approximating that found in high-stimulus election years in countries such as
Canada, Great Britain and France. This would add about 1,850,000 more actual voters than came
to the polls in 1968. Presented in tabular form, the approximate results of changes in electoral law
suggested in Questions 13 and 14 (these are maximum results, assuming that no other intervening
variables in Texas turnout exist) would look as follows:
Actual Voting in 1%8 Compared with Potential




Permanent personal registration: lower limit 4,020,000 +941,000
Permanent personal registration: upper limit 4,328,000 + 1,249,000
Governmental maintenance of registry 4,947,000 + 1,868,000
Potential electorate, 1968 (approximate) 6,184,000 ...
15. It seems reasonably certain to me that such a change as a transition to a permanent personal
registration system-qualified by the need to ensure that the books remain open until at least several
weeks before election day-would result in significant increases in participation by voters in the
working classes. It could be anticipated that such a change would contribute to such increases both
in major metropolitan centers such as Houston and Dallas, and in the more rural counties of the
state as well.
16. Adoption of a system of registration in which public authority assumed the burden of
maintaining and updating electoral registers would be accompanied by massive reductions in the
class bias now prevalent in electoral participation in this country. To the extent that other factors
exist which work to depress lower-class participation in voting in the United States, it may be that
some class bias would remain, particularly in the early years of such a system. In the long run, such
bias would tend to disappear under a system of governmental registration of qualified voters. I am
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not, of course, a constitutional lawyer. But so strong do these relationships between voting and
registration requirement seem to me to be that I am now prepared to express the view that any
system of personal registration works in practical fact to deprive persons in specific classes of equal
protection of the laws. The Texas statute under review, with its requirement for periodic re-
registration and a closing of the registry lists more than nine months prior to the date of the general
election, is a particularly extreme case and is associated with extremely low voting participation,
particularly in non-presidential years.
17. Yes, I have written on this subject. One short piece which I have recently completed is a
study, "Registration Statutes and Electoral Participation." A more extensive treatment of the
historical antecedents of personal registration statutes and other laws affecting participation is to be
found in my forthcoming book, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings ofA merican Politics (New
York: Norton, 1970).
The sources of my research materials are severalfold: (1) Estimates of potential electorate derived
from census data and, wherever possible, omitting nonqualified adults (e.g., noncitizens,
institutional populations, etc.). I enclose an updated statement of estimated turnout in American
presidential elections by state, 1824-1968. Additionally, I have developed county data based on
census data and linear intercensal interpolations for the states of Ohio (1900-1960), Pennsylvania
(1900-1960), New York (1844-1870 and 1952-1968), Alabama (1868-1908 and 1952-1968),
Louisiana (1952-1968), North Carolina (1868-1908 and 1952-1968), and Missouri (1900-1960). (2)
Registration statutes in several American states and a 1956 Library of Congress compendium of all
American state election laws, as well as relevant discussions of British electoral law. (3) Compendia
of European electoral laws and voting participation (e.g., Dolf Sternberger and Bernhard Vogel
(eds.), Die Wahl der Parlamente, Band I: Europa (Berlin: Walter de Gruytcr & Co., 1969); (4)
Secondary accounts of suffrage and electoral law in the United States, such as those of Merriam &
Gosnell and Key mentioned earlier.
The method used to reach these conclusions is, so far as possible, quantitative, i.e., the
development of accurate dati for countries and states (and in some cases counties) with different
registration laws, and the application of statistical method to those data. Of course, such research is
informed by a theory concerning the peculiarities and dynamics of American politics. Of necessity,
the inferences which I have drawn have sometimes been qualitative if, one hopes, informed
judgments based on many years of professional study of voting behavior.
Walter Dean Burnham
Professor of Political Science
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1900 81.3 37.87 6.15
1904 76.8 78.23 8.84
1908 77.9 39.97 6.32
1912 70.6 31.31 5.60
1916 69.4 43.33 6.58
1920 48.5 42.04 6.48
1924 53.0 49.71 7.05
1928 65.9 47.88 6.92
1932 61.6 60.99 7.81
1936 80.0 55.22 7.43
1940 68.8 54.12 7.36
1944 58.6 46.16 6.79
1948 52.2 58.06 7.62
1952 64.4 60.89 7.80
1956 67.0 65.20 8.07
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ANNEX II
Missouri: Turnout 1920-1960









































Ohio: Turnout by Categories of
Registration in Counties, 1932-1960
Full Registration Partial Registration
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ANNEX IV
Participation Rates In Texas and the United States, 1928-1968















Correlations between Turnout and Socio-Political Variables
All (N = 83) (M 34.0% Nonwhite)








% Children in Public Schools -0.676
% Dem. 1952 -0.631
% Dem. 1956 -0.340
% Dem. 1960 -0.513
% Dem. 1964 -0.565
% Dem. 1968 -0.448
% Rep. 1968 +0.576
% Wallace 1968 -0.046
% Dem. 1954 -0.057
% Dem. 1958 -0.336
% Dem. 1962 -0.413
% Dem. 1966 +0.150
% Rep. 1966 -0.174
% Ind. 1966 +0.115
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Turnout Data in Certain Political Systems before World War II





Officials in Intermediate Position
Lower Officials





Which very roughly collapses to the following
analogue to US stratification:
Upper, Professional, Managerial 90.4
Middle Classes (White Collar) 90.8
Skilled Workers 87.9
Unskilled and No Occupation 86.8



















Free Professions (lawyers, doctors, etc.)
Public Service
No Occupation:












* Source: H. L. A. Tingsten, Political Behavior (Stockholm 1937), p. 141.
** Source: Ibid., p. 154.
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ANNEX VIII A.
Sweden: Voter Participation by Sex and
Broad Occupational Category, 1960*
Category Electoral Participation in %, 1960 N of
Men Women Total Cases
Non-Agricultural:
Employers and Professional
Workers 91.1 90.6 90.8 18,371
Office Employees (Salaried) 90.9 90.4 90.7 15,722
Salaried Service Employees
(Including governmental) 93.8 91.3 92.5 8,493
Other Salaried Employees 90.0 88.0 88.6 13,335
Foremen and Craftsmen 93.2 93.5 93.3 4,084
Workers 88.0 87.0 87.5 60,064
Independent, Members of
Families 78.1 72.9 75.5 23,275
Agricultural:
Farmers & Farm Managers 90.4 86.4 88.4 19,890
Farm and Other Workers 80.9 84. 1 82.5 6,834
Total, 1960 87.6 85.5 86.6 163,339
* Based on a 1/30th sample of the total voting-age population.
Source: StatistiskArsbokforSverige, 1964, p. 3 8 0 .
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ANNEX VIII B.
United States: Voter Participation by Sex and
Broad Occupational Category, 1968*
Category Electoral Participation in %, 1968
Men Women Total
Non-Agricultural:
Professional & Managerial 81.4 82.7 81.8
Clerical, Sales & Kindred Workers 79.0 76.5 77.4
Manual Workers: 63.5 56.9 62.3
Craftsmen, Foremen, etc. 68.6 69.3 68.6
Operatives & Kindred Workers 60.3 56.0 58.9
Laborers, except Farm & Mine- 54.8 54.3 54.8
Service Workers 67.6 60.2 62.7
Agricultural:
Farmers, Farm Managers 82.3 66.5 81.6
Farm Laborers & Foremen 42.4 62.1 50.6
Total USA, 1968 71.4 70.6 71.1
* Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 192 (De-
cember 2, 1969), Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1968, p. 22.
There is, it should be noted, a major anomaly in the American survey which does not appear
in the Swedish. The Swedish survey indicates a turnout rate of 86.6%, while the aggregate returns
yield a turnout rate of 85.9%-an overreporting of 0.7%. In the United States, however, the percentage
of the potential electorate which actually voted was approximately 60.6%; the survey above thus
overreports actual participation by 10.5%. There are good reasons to believe that this overreporting
(and other census data problems) is also heavily class-biased and, hence, that the true turnout
figures for lower-class populations are considerably below those reported above. See David M.
Heer, ed., Social Statistics and the City (Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Urban Studies, 1968).
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ANNEX IX A.
Average (Mean) Electoral Participation in
Twenty Western Nations, 1945-1969



























All others except United States
English-speaking countries except Australia
and United States
Nations of Continental Europe + Israel
United States
(Texas, 1948-1968:
Mean Turnout
95,5
92.3
92.4
Mean Turnout
94.9
76.3
85.0
78.9
79.0
Mean Turnout
93.4
83.3
80.0
84.4
59.9
40.8)
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